In my last post I posed the thought there was going to be a little drama in Washington DC on the 6th of January. I was thinking that it would come from politicians. A physical assault on the capital building in which rioters gained access to the floor of the House of Congress and sent its members into hiding was certainly not something I thought possible even in the crazy that is America today. I guess they have gone further down the road to anarchy than I had imagined.
This morning I read this New York Times essay by Timothy Snyder and I thought it to so very insightful of the situation in the United States. As such, his words are deeply disturbing to me because I just don't see Americans accepting any truth that is not in line with their political creed.
The
American Abyss
A
historian of fascism and political atrocity on Trump, the mob and
what comes next.
By
Timothy Snyder
When
Donald Trump stood before his followers on Jan. 6 and urged them
to march on the United States Capitol, he was doing what he had
always done. He never took electoral democracy seriously nor accepted
the legitimacy of its American version.
Even
when he won, in 2016, he insisted that the election was
fraudulent — that millions of false votes were cast for his
opponent. In 2020, in the knowledge that he was trailing Joseph R.
Biden in the polls, he spent months claiming that the
presidential election would be rigged and signalling that he would
not accept the results if they did not favor him. He wrongly claimed
on Election Day that he had won and then steadily hardened his
rhetoric: With time, his victory became a historic landslide and the
various conspiracies that denied it ever more sophisticated and
implausible.
People
believed him, which is not at all surprising. It takes a tremendous
amount of work to educate citizens to resist the powerful pull of
believing what they already believe, or what others around them
believe, or what would make sense of their own previous choices.
Plato noted a particular risk for tyrants: that they would be
surrounded in the end by yes-men and enablers. Aristotle worried
that, in a democracy, a wealthy and talented demagogue could all too
easily master the minds of the populace. Aware of these risks and
others, the framers of the Constitution instituted a system of checks
and balances. The point was not simply to ensure that no one branch
of government dominated the others but also to anchor in institutions
different points of view.
In
this sense, the responsibility for Trump’s push to overturn an
election must be shared by a very large number of Republican members
of Congress. Rather than contradict Trump from the beginning, they
allowed his electoral fiction to flourish. They had different reasons
for doing so. One group of Republicans is concerned above all with
gaming the system to maintain power, taking full advantage of
constitutional obscurities, gerrymandering and dark money to win
elections with a minority of motivated voters. They have no interest
in the collapse of the peculiar form of representation that allows
their minority party disproportionate control of government. The most
important among them, Mitch McConnell, indulged Trump’s lie
while making no comment on its consequences.
Yet
other Republicans saw the situation differently: They might actually
break the system and have power without democracy. The split between
these two groups, the gamers and the breakers, became sharply visible
on Dec. 30, when Senator Josh Hawley announced that he
would support Trump’s challenge by questioning the validity of the
electoral votes on Jan. 6. Ted Cruz then promised his own
support, joined by about 10 other senators. More than a hundred
Republican representatives took the same position. For many, this
seemed like nothing more than a show: challenges to states’
electoral votes would force delays and floor votes but would not
affect the outcome.
Yet
for Congress to traduce its basic functions had a price. An elected
institution that opposes elections is inviting its own overthrow.
Members of Congress who sustained the president’s lie, despite the
available and unambiguous evidence, betrayed their constitutional
mission. Making his fictions the basis of congressional action gave
them flesh. Now Trump could demand that senators and congressmen bow
to his will. He could place personal responsibility upon Mike Pence,
in charge of the formal proceedings, to pervert them. And on Jan. 6,
he directed his followers to exert pressure on these elected
representatives, which they proceeded to do: storming the
Capitol building, searching for people to punish, ransacking the
place.
Of
course this did make a kind of sense: If the election really had been
stolen, as senators and congressmen were themselves suggesting, then
how could Congress be allowed to move forward? For some Republicans,
the invasion of the Capitol must have been a shock, or even a lesson.
For the breakers, however, it may have been a taste of the future.
Afterward, eight senators and more than 100 representatives voted for
the lie that had forced them to flee their chambers.
Post-truth
is pre-fascism, and Trump has been our post-truth president.
When we give up on truth, we concede power to those with the wealth
and charisma to create spectacle in its place. Without agreement
about some basic facts, citizens cannot form the civil society that
would allow them to defend themselves. If we lose the institutions
that produce facts that are pertinent to us, then we tend to wallow
in attractive abstractions and fictions. Truth defends itself
particularly poorly when there is not very much of it around, and the
era of Trump — like the era of Vladimir Putin in Russia — is one
of the decline of local news. Social media is no substitute: It
supercharges the mental habits by which we seek emotional stimulation
and comfort, which means losing the distinction between what feels
true and what actually is true.
Post-truth
wears away the rule of law and invites a regime of myth. These last
four years, scholars have discussed the legitimacy and value of
invoking fascism in reference to Trumpian propaganda. One comfortable
position has been to label any such effort as a direct comparison and
then to treat such comparisons as taboo. More productively, the
philosopher Jason Stanley has treated fascism as a phenomenon, as a
series of patterns that can be observed not only in interwar Europe
but beyond it.
My
own view is that greater knowledge of the past, fascist or otherwise,
allows us to notice and conceptualize elements of the present that we
might otherwise disregard and to think more broadly about future
possibilities. It was clear to me in October that Trump’s behavior
presaged a coup, and I said so in print; this is not because the
present repeats the past, but because the past enlightens the
present.
Like
historical fascist leaders, Trump has presented himself as the single
source of truth. His use of the term “fake news” echoed the Nazi
smear Lügenpresse (“lying press”); like the Nazis, he
referred to reporters as “enemies of the people.” Like Adolf
Hitler, he came to power at a moment when the conventional press had
taken a beating; the financial crisis of 2008 did to American
newspapers what the Great Depression did to German ones. The Nazis
thought that they could use radio to replace the old pluralism of the
newspaper; Trump tried to do the same with Twitter.
Thanks
to technological capacity and personal talent, Donald Trump lied at a
pace perhaps unmatched by any other leader in history. For the most
part these were small lies, and their main effect was cumulative. To
believe in all of them was to accept the authority of a single man,
because to believe in all of them was to disbelieve everything else.
Once such personal authority was established, the president could
treat everyone else as the liars; he even had the power to turn
someone from a trusted adviser into a dishonest scoundrel with a
single tweet. Yet so long as he was unable to enforce some truly big
lie, some fantasy that created an alternative reality where people
could live and die, his pre-fascism fell short of the thing itself.
Some
of his lies were, admittedly, medium-size: that he was a successful
businessman; that Russia did not support him in 2016; that Barack Obama was born in Kenya. Such medium-size lies were the standard fare
of aspiring authoritarians in the 21st century. In Poland the
right-wing party built a martyrdom cult around assigning blame to
political rivals for an airplane crash that killed the nation’s
president. Hungary’s Viktor Orban blames a vanishingly small number
of Muslim refugees for his country’s problems. But such claims
were not quite big lies; they stretched but did not rend what Hannah
Arendt called “the fabric of factuality.”
One
historical big lie discussed by Arendt is Joseph Stalin’s
explanation of starvation in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33. The state had
collectivized agriculture, then applied a series of punitive measures
to Ukraine that ensured millions would die. Yet the official line was
that the starving were provocateurs, agents of Western powers who
hated socialism so much they were killing themselves. A still grander
fiction, in Arendt’s account, is Hitlerian anti-Semitism: the
claims that Jews ran the world, Jews were responsible for ideas that
poisoned German minds, Jews stabbed Germany in the back during the
First World War. Intriguingly, Arendt thought big lies work only in
lonely minds; their coherence substitutes for experience and
companionship.
In
November 2020, reaching millions of lonely minds through social
media, Trump told a lie that was dangerously ambitious: that he
had won an election that in fact he had lost. This lie
was big in every pertinent respect: not as big as “Jews run the
world,” but big enough. The significance of the matter at hand was
great: the right to rule the most powerful country in the world and
the efficacy and trustworthiness of its succession procedures. The
level of mendacity was profound. The claim was not only wrong, but it
was also made in bad faith, amid unreliable sources. It challenged
not just evidence but logic: Just how could (and why would) an
election have been rigged against a Republican president but not
against Republican senators and representatives? Trump had to speak,
absurdly, of a “Rigged (for President) Election.”
The
force of a big lie resides in its demand that many other things must
be believed or disbelieved. To make sense of a world in which the
2020 presidential election was stolen requires distrust not only of
reporters and of experts but also of local, state and federal
government institutions, from poll workers to elected officials,
Homeland Security and all the way to the Supreme Court. It brings
with it, of necessity, a conspiracy theory: Imagine all the people
who must have been in on such a plot and all the people who would
have had to work on the cover-up.
Trump’s
electoral fiction floats free of verifiable reality. It is defended
not so much by facts as by claims that someone else has made some
claims. The sensibility is that something must be wrong because I
feel it to be wrong, and I know others feel the same way. When
political leaders such as Ted Cruz or Jim Jordan spoke like this,
what they meant was: You believe my lies, which compels me to repeat
them. Social media provides an infinity of apparent evidence for any
conviction, especially one seemingly held by a president.
On
the surface, a conspiracy theory makes its victim look strong: It
sees Trump as resisting the Democrats, the Republicans, the Deep
State, the pedophiles, the Satanists. More profoundly, however, it
inverts the position of the strong and the weak. Trump’s focus on
alleged “irregularities” and “contested states” comes down to
cities where Black people live and vote. At bottom, the fantasy of
fraud is that of a crime committed by Black people against white
people.
It’s
not just that electoral fraud by African-Americans against Donald
Trump never happened. It is that it is the very opposite of what
happened, in 2020 and in every American election. As always, Black
people waited longer than others to vote and were more
likely to have their votes challenged. They were more likely to
be suffering or dying from Covid-19, and less likely to be
able to take time away from work. The historical protection of their
right to vote has been removed by the Supreme Court’s 2013
ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, and states have rushed to
pass measures of a kind that historically reduce voting by the poor
and communities of color.
The
claim that Trump was denied a win by fraud is a big lie not just
because it mauls logic, misdescribes the present and demands belief
in a conspiracy. It is a big lie, fundamentally, because it reverses
the moral field of American politics and the basic structure of
American history.
When
Senator Ted Cruz announced his intention to challenge the Electoral
College vote, he invoked the Compromise of 1877, which resolved the
presidential election of 1876. Commentators pointed out that this was
no relevant precedent, since back then there really were serious
voter irregularities and there really was a stalemate in Congress.
For African-Americans, however, the seemingly gratuitous reference
led somewhere else. The Compromise of 1877 — in which Rutherford B.
Hayes would have the presidency, provided that he withdrew federal
power from the South — was the very arrangement whereby
African-Americans were driven from voting booths for the better part
of a century. It was effectively the end of Reconstruction, the
beginning of segregation, legal discrimination and Jim Crow. It is
the original sin of American history in the post-slavery era, our
closest brush with fascism so far.
If
the reference seemed distant when Ted Cruz and 10 senatorial
colleagues released their statement on Jan. 2, it was brought very
close four days later, when Confederate flags were paraded through
the Capitol.
Some
things have changed since 1877, of course. Back then, it was the
Republicans, or many of them, who supported racial equality; it was
the Democrats, the party of the South, who wanted apartheid. It was
the Democrats, back then, who called African-Americans’ votes
fraudulent, and the Republicans who wanted them counted. This is now
reversed. In the past half century, since the Civil Rights Act,
Republicans have become a predominantly white party interested — as
Trump openly declared — in keeping the number of voters, and
particularly the number of Black voters, as low as possible. Yet the
common thread remains. Watching white supremacists among the people
storming the Capitol, it was easy to yield to the feeling that
something pure had been violated. It might be better to see the
episode as part of a long American argument about who deserves
representation.
The
Democrats, today, have become a coalition, one that does better than
Republicans with female and nonwhite voters and collects votes from
both labor unions and the college-educated. Yet it’s not quite
right to contrast this coalition with a monolithic Republican Party.
Right now, the Republican Party is a coalition of two types of
people: those who would game the system (most of the politicians,
some of the voters) and those who dream of breaking it (a few of the
politicians, many of the voters). In January 2021, this was visible
as the difference between those Republicans who defended the present
system on the grounds that it favored them and those who tried to
upend it.
In
the four decades since the election of Ronald Reagan, Republicans
have overcome the tension between the gamers and the breakers by
governing in opposition to government, or by calling elections a
revolution (the Tea Party), or by claiming to oppose elites. The
breakers, in this arrangement, provide cover for the gamers, putting
forth an ideology that distracts from the basic reality that
government under Republicans is not made smaller but simply diverted
to serve a handful of interests.
At
first, Trump seemed like a threat to this balance. His lack of
experience in politics and his open racism made him a very
uncomfortable figure for the party; his habit of continually telling
lies was initially found by prominent Republicans to be uncouth. Yet
after he won the presidency, his particular skills as a breaker
seemed to create a tremendous opportunity for the gamers. Led by the
gamer in chief, McConnell, they secured hundreds of federal judges
and tax cuts for the rich.
Trump
was unlike other breakers in that he seemed to have no ideology. His
objection to institutions was that they might constrain him
personally. He intended to break the system to serve himself — and
this is partly why he has failed. Trump is a charismatic politician
and inspires devotion not only among voters but among a surprising
number of lawmakers, but he has no vision that is greater than
himself or what his admirers project upon him. In this respect his
pre-fascism fell short of fascism: His vision never went further than
a mirror. He arrived at a truly big lie not from any view of the
world but from the reality that he might lose something.
Yet
Trump never prepared a decisive blow. He lacked the support of the
military, some of whose leaders he had alienated. (No true fascist
would have made the mistake he did there, which was to openly love
foreign dictators; supporters convinced that the enemy was at home
might not mind, but those sworn to protect from enemies abroad did.)
Trump’s secret police force, the men carrying out snatch
operations in Portland,was violent but also small and ludicrous.
Social media proved to be a blunt weapon: Trump could announce his
intentions on Twitter, and white supremacists could plan their
invasion of the Capitol on Facebook or Gab. But the president, for
all his lawsuits and entreaties and threats to public officials,
could not engineer a situation that ended with the right people doing
the wrong thing. Trump could make some voters believe that he had won
the 2020 election, but he was unable to bring institutions along with
his big lie. And he could bring his supporters to Washington and send
them on a rampage in the Capitol, but none appeared to have any very
clear idea of how this was to work or what their presence would
accomplish. It is hard to think of a comparable insurrectionary
moment, when a building of great significance was seized, that
involved so much milling around.
The
lie outlasts the liar. The idea that Germany lost the First
World War in 1918 because of a Jewish “stab in the back” was 15
years old when Hitler came to power. How will Trump’s myth of
victimhood function in American life 15 years from now? And to whose
benefit?
On
Jan. 7, Trump called for a peaceful transition of power, implicitly
conceding that his putsch had failed. Even then, though, he repeated
and even amplified his electoral fiction: It was now a sacred cause
for which people had sacrificed. Trump’s imagined stab in the back
will live on chiefly thanks to its endorsement by members of
Congress. In November and December 2020, Republicans repeated it,
giving it a life it would not otherwise have had. In retrospect, it
now seems as though the last shaky compromise between the gamers and
the breakers was the idea that Trump should have every chance to
prove that wrong had been done to him. That position implicitly
endorsed the big lie for Trump supporters who were inclined to
believe it. It failed to restrain Trump, whose big lie only grew
bigger.
The
breakers and the gamers then saw a different world ahead, where the
big lie was either a treasure to be had or a danger to be avoided.
The breakers had no choice but to rush to be first to claim to
believe in it. Because the breakers Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz must
compete to claim the brimstone and bile, the gamers were forced to
reveal their own hand, and the division within the Republican
coalition became visible on Jan. 6. The invasion of the Capitol only
reinforced this division. To be sure, a few senators withdrew their
objections, but Cruz and Hawley moved forward anyway, along with six
other senators. More than 100 representatives doubled down on the big
lie. Some, like Matt Gaetz, even added their own flourishes, such as
the claim that the mob was led not by Trump’s supporters but by his
opponents.
Trump
is, for now, the martyr in chief, the high priest of the big lie. He
is the leader of the breakers, at least in the minds of his
supporters. By now, the gamers do not want Trump around. Discredited
in his last weeks, he is useless; shorn of the obligations of the
presidency, he will become embarrassing again, much as he was in
2015. Unable to provide cover for their gamesmanship, he will be
irrelevant to their daily purposes. But the breakers have an even
stronger reason to see Trump disappear: It is impossible to inherit
from someone who is still around. Seizing Trump’s big lie might
appear to be a gesture of support. In fact it expresses a wish for
his political death. Transforming the myth from one about Trump to
one about the nation will be easier when he is out of the way.
As
Cruz and Hawley may learn, to tell the big lie is to be owned by it.
Just because you have sold your soul does not mean that you have
driven a hard bargain. Hawley shies from no level of hypocrisy; the
son of a banker, educated at Stanford University and Yale Law School,
he denounces elites. Insofar as Cruz was thought to have a principle,
it was that of states’ rights, which Trump’s calls to action
brazenly violated. A joint statement Cruz issued about the senators’
challenge to the vote nicely captured the post-truth aspect of the
whole: It never alleged that there was fraud, only that there were
allegations of fraud. Allegations of allegations, allegations all the
way down.
The
big lie requires commitment. When Republican gamers do not exhibit
enough of that, Republican breakers call them “RINOs”:
Republicans in name only. This term once suggested a lack of
ideological commitment. It now means an unwillingness to throw away
an election. The gamers, in response, close ranks around the
Constitution and speak of principles and traditions. The breakers
must all know (with the possible exception of the Alabama senator
Tommy Tuberville) that they are participating in a sham, but they
will have an audience of tens of millions who do not.
If
Trump remains present in American political life, he will surely
repeat his big lie incessantly. Hawley and Cruz and the other
breakers share responsibility for where this leads. Cruz and Hawley
seem to be running for president. Yet what does it mean to be a
candidate for office and denounce voting? If you claim that the other
side has cheated, and your supporters believe you, they will expect
you to cheat yourself. By defending Trump’s big lie on Jan. 6, they
set a precedent: A Republican presidential candidate who loses an
election should be appointed anyway by Congress. Republicans in the
future, at least breaker candidates for president, will presumably
have a Plan A, to win and win, and a Plan B, to lose and win. No
fraud is necessary; only allegations that there are allegations of
fraud. Truth is to be replaced by spectacle, facts by faith.
Trump’s
coup attempt of 2020-21, like other failed coup attempts, is a
warning for those who care about the rule of law and a lesson for
those who do not. His pre-fascism revealed a possibility for American
politics. For a coup to work in 2024, the breakers will require
something that Trump never quite had: an angry minority, organized
for nationwide violence, ready to add intimidation to an election.
Four years of amplifying a big lie just might get them this. To claim
that the other side stole an election is to promise to steal one
yourself. It is also to claim that the other side deserves to be
punished.
Informed
observers inside and outside government agree that right-wing white
supremacism is the greatest terrorist threat to the United States.
Gun sales in 2020 hit an astonishing high. History shows that
political violence follows when prominent leaders of major political
parties openly embrace paranoia.
Our
big lie is typically American, wrapped in our odd electoral system,
depending upon our particular traditions of racism. Yet our big lie
is also structurally fascist, with its extreme mendacity, its
conspiratorial thinking, its reversal of perpetrators and victims and
its implication that the world is divided into us and them. To keep
it going for four years courts terrorism and assassination.
When
that violence comes, the breakers will have to react. If they embrace
it, they become the fascist faction. The Republican Party will be
divided, at least for a time. One can of course imagine a dismal
reunification: A breaker candidate loses a narrow presidential
election in November 2024 and cries fraud, the Republicans win both
houses of Congress and rioters in the street, educated by four years
of the big lie, demand what they see as justice. Would the gamers
stand on principle if those were the circumstances of Jan. 6, 2025?
To
be sure, this moment is also a chance. It is possible that a divided
Republican Party might better serve American democracy; that the
gamers, separated from the breakers, might start to think of policy
as a way to win elections. It is very likely that the Biden-Harris
administration will have an easier first few months than expected;
perhaps obstructionism will give way, at least among a few
Republicans and for a short time, to a moment of self-questioning.
Politicians who want Trumpism to end have a simple way forward: Tell
the truth about the election.
America
will not survive the big lie just because a liar is separated from
power. It will need a thoughtful repluralization of media and a
commitment to facts as a public good. The racism structured into
every aspect of the coup attempt is a call to heed our own history.
Serious attention to the past helps us to see risks but also suggests
future possibility. We cannot be a democratic republic if we tell
lies about race, big or small. Democracy is not about minimizing the
vote nor ignoring it, neither a matter of gaming nor of breaking a
system, but of accepting the equality of others, heeding their voices
and counting their votes.
Timothy
Snyder is the Levin professor of history at Yale University and
the author of histories of political atrocity including “Bloodlands”
and “Black Earth,” as well as the book “On Tyranny,” on
America’s turn toward authoritarianism. His most recent book is
“Our Malady,” a memoir of his own near-fatal illness reflecting
on the relationship between health and freedom.